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Equilibrium Refinement in Finite Evidence Games
Shaofei Jiang
∗
Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively
disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often
have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on truth-leaning equilibria,
i.e., perfect Bayesian equilibria where the sender prefers disclosing truthfully when
indifferent, and the receiver takes off-path disclosure at face value. They show that
a truth-leaning equilibrium is an equilibrium of a perturbed game where the sender
has an infinitesimal reward for truth-telling. We show that, when the receiver’s action
space is finite, truth-leaning equilibrium may fail to exist, and it is not equivalent to
equilibrium of the perturbed game. To restore existence, we introduce a disturbed
game with a small uncertainty about the receiver’s payoff. A purifiable equilibrium is
a truth-leaning equilibrium in an infinitesimally disturbed game. It exists and features
a simple characterization. A truth-leaning equilibrium that is also purifiable is an
equilibrium of the perturbed game.
Keywords: Hard evidence, Verifiable disclosure, Equilibrium refinement
JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83
1. Introduction. In many real-life situations, communiation relies on hard evidence.
For example, a jury’s verdict should be based on evidence presented in the court, rather
than exchanges of empty claims. Evidence games study such situations. There is a sender
(e.g., a prosecutor), and a receiver (e.g., a jury). The sender has some hard evidence about
an unknown state of the world (e.g., whether a defendant is guilty) and wants to persuade
the receiver to take a certain action (e.g., to reach a guilty verdict) by selectively presenting
evidence. Full revelation of evidence is often impossible in the presence of conflict of interest
between the sender and the receiver–the receiver wants to learn the payoff relevant state and
act accordingly, whereas the sender merely wants to induce her preferred receiver action.
Therefore, the sender has an incentive to persuade the receiver that a certain state is more
likely by partially revealing evidence.
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A distinguishing feature of evidence games (as opposed to signaling games and cheap-talk
communication) is that the receiver’s private information (i.e., her evidence) is not payoff
relevant. Instead, it affects her ability to persuade the receiver by restricting her set of
feasible actions (i.e., the set of evidence she can present to the receiver). That is, the sender
can selectively disclose evidence that she has but cannot fabricate evidence. For example,
the prosecutor’s objective is to convict the defendant. This is not affected by what evidence
she has. In equilibrium, her chance of convicting the defendant may depend on the evidence
she has, becuase when she has more evidence, there are more ways to present evidence in
the court, and thereby she may better persuade the jury.
Evidence games often have multiple (Nash) equilibria. For example, there is a trivial
equilibrim where, regardless of her evidence, the prosecutor presents no evidence, and the
jury always acquits the defendant (this must be optimal on the equilibrium path for the
jury if the presumption of innocence is practiced). Obviously, it is not a sensible prediction
of what happens in courtrooms. However, this equilibrium is perfect (Selten, 1975) and
sequential (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Consider a perturbation to the prosecutor’s strategy
which puts higher probability on disclosing acquitting evidence than on disclosing convicting
evidence, and a perturbation to the jury’s strategy such that the probability of convicting
the defendant after seeing any evidence is smaller than that after seeing no evidence. As both
perturbations converge to zero, this gives a sequence of ε-constrained equilibria in completely
mixed strategies that converges to the trivial equilibrium. Hence, the trivial equilibrium is
perfect. Moreover, given the perturbed sender’s strategy, it is consistent for the jury to
believe that the actual evidence possessed by the prosecutor is more acquitting after seeing
any disclosed evidence. Therefore, the trivial equilibrium is also a sequential equilibrium.
Hart et al. (2017) (henceforth HKP) propose the following refinement to perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in evidence games.1 A truth-leaning equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
such that
(Truth-leaning) Given the receiver’s strategy, the sender discloses her evidence truthfully
if doing so is optimal;
(Off-path beliefs) The receiver takes any off-path disclosure at face value (i.e., he believes
that the sender discloses truthfully).
These conditions (especially the first one) are intuitive for evidence games. As is argued in
HKP, these conditions follow the simple intuition that there is a “slight inherent advantage”
for the sender to tell the whole truth, and “there must be good reasons for not telling it.”
1HKP defines truth-leaning equilibrium as a refinement to Nash equilibrium. However, we note that
any truth-leaning equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. We regard all
solution concepts in the current paper as refinements to perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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HKP study evidence games where the receiver continuously chooses an action on the
real line, the receiver’s expected payoff is a single-peaked function of his action given any
distribution of the state, and the sender strictly prefers higher receiver acton. They show
that a truth-leaning equilibrium exists and is receiver optimal. That is, any truth-leaning
equilibrium yields the same ex post payoffs as the optimal mechanism where the receiver
can commit to an action plan. Jiang (2019) studies evidence games where the state of the
world is binary, the receiver’s optimal action is monotone in his posterior belief, and the
sender strictly prefers higher receiver action. He shows that the truth-leaning equilibrium
is essentially unique in any evidence game and provides a method to solve the truth-leaning
equilibrium.
However, in many applications of evidence games, the receiver takes a discrete action.
For example, juries choose between conviction and acquittal, banks decide whether or not
to grant a loan, and rating agencies rate financial assets into finitely many grades. In such
situations, both assumptons of HKP and Jiang (2019) are violated. A part of this paper
is to answer the following question: is truth-leaning equilibrium a “good” solution concept
when the receiver’s action set is finite?
The short answer is “no,” and one reason is that a truth-leaning equilibrium may fail to
exist. Loosely speaking, nonexistence arises because the sender lacks a strict incentive to
persuade the receiver.2 To address this problem, we propose the following solution concept
by introducing a small uncertainty (i.e., disturbance) to the receiver’s payoff a` la Harsanyi
(1973). Suppose that the receiver receives a random private payoff shock associated with
each of his actions. In the disturbed game, the sender has a strict incentive to persuade
the receiver, and a truth-leaning equilibrium exists in the disturbed game.3 We define a
purifiable equilibrium as the limit of a sequence of truth-leaning equilibria in the disturbed
games as the disturbances converge to zero. That is, a purifiable equilibrium is a truth-
leaning equilibrium of an infinitesimally disturbed game. A purifiable equilibrium always
exists.
Another problem of truth-leaning equilibrium in finite evidence games is that it may not
follow the intuition that the sender is slightly more advantageous if she discloses truthfully.
2In both HKP and Jiang (2019), if a piece of evidence e′ is inherently better than the sender’s evidence e
(i.e., the receiver’s optimal action knowing that the sender’s evidence is e′ is strictly higher than his optimal
action knowing that the sender’s evidence is e) and the sender can feasibly disclose e′, then the sender’s
payoff from any randomization between disclosing e′ and e is strictly higher than her payoff from disclosing
only e, given any Bayesian consistent system of beliefs of the receiver and any sequentially rational receiver
strategy. This is not the case when the receiver’s action is finite.
3For example, the prosecutor does not know how lenient the jury is (i.e., how convinced the jury has
to be in order to reach a conviction). However, she knows that after seeing more convicting evidence, the
probability that the jury will choose to convict the defendant is higher. Therefore, the prosecutor strictly
prefers presenting all convicting evidence.
3
To formalize this intuition, we revisit the perturbed game in HKP, where the sender receives
a small reward if she discloses truthfully, and the sender must disclose truthfully with at least
some small probability. We define a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium as the limit of a sequence
of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the perturbed games as the perturbations converge to zero.
HKP shows that truth-leaning equilibrium is equivalent to weakly truth-leaning equilibrium.
When the receiver’s action space is finite, however, the equivalence is no longer true. It
turns out that purifiability is the missing condition connecting truth-leaning and weakly
truth-leaning equilibrium–a purifiable truth-leaning equilibrium is weakly truth-leaning, and
a purifiable weakly truth-leaning equilibrium is truth-leaning in “almost all” evidence games.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 presents an example where truth-leaning equilibrium
does not exist and illustrates the constructions of purifiable equilibrium and weakly truth-
leaning equilibrium. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 formally defines purifiable
equilibrium and shows the relationship between purifiable equilibrium, truth-leaning equi-
librium, and weakly truth-leaning equilibrium. The last section concludes. Proofs are in the
Appendix.
2. A Simple Example and Discussion. Every new aircraft design has to be certified
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) before any aircraft built according to this
design can enter service (in the U.S.). Like other innovations, altering the design of an
aircraft often entails high level of risks.4 The FAA often has to rely on information and
test results provided by airplane manufacturers, yet airplane manufactueres’ disclosure is far
from complete.5
Consider an airplane manufacturer (the sender) seeking to get a new aircraft design
certified by the FAA (the receiver). The design can be good or bad with equal likelihood.
If the design is bad, the aircraft manufacturer has some bad evidence (e.g., machanical
failures during test flights) with probability 2
3
. Otherwise, the aircraft manufacturer has
no evidence. The FAA does not know the quality of the design and chooses to Approve
or Reject the aircraft design based on evidence disclosed by the sender. The disclosure of
bad evidence is voluntary and verifiable (i.e., the sender can disclose bad evidence or no
evidence if it has bad evidence, and it can only disclose no evidence if it has no evidence).
4For example, a design deficiency of the batery system on board Boeing’s 787 Dreamliners had caused sev-
eral aircraft fires in 2013, which led to the grounding of all 50 aircrafts at the time and a redesign of the battery
system (see https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/boeing-787-dreamliner-investigation-report).
More recently, MCAS, a new fligh control software embedded into Boeing’s 737 MAX aircrafts, caused two
deadly crashes wihtin two years of the airliner’s first commercial operation. The entire fleet has since then
been grounded (see https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html).
5In the 737 MAX incident, Boeing failed to inform the FAA of a design change of MCAS (see
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/business/boeing-737-max.html).
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The airplane manufacturer’s payoff depends only on the FAA’s action: it receives 1 if the
design is approved and 0 if the design is rejected. The FAA, on the other hand, gains from
approving a good design and loses from approving a bad design. Its payoff is 0 if it rejects
the design, is 1 if it approves a good design, and is -2 if it approves a bad design. Hence, the
FAA has a cutoff decision rule. If, after observing the disclosed evidence, its posterior belief
that the design is good exceeds 2
3
, its optimal action is Approve; if its posterior belief is less
than 2
3
, its optimal action is Reject ; if its posterior belief is exactly 2
3
, either action as well
as any randomization between the two actions is optimal.
A strategy of the sender describes how it discloses bad evidence. Let p be the probability
that the sender discloses no evidence if it has bad evidence. Since bad evidence fully reveals
that the design is bad, the receiver always chooses Reject (thus the sender gets 0) after
seeing bad evidence. Let q be the probability that the receiver chooses Approve after seeing
no evidence. Let µ be the receiver’s posterior belief that the design is good after seeing no
evidence. Since no evidence is always disclosed with postive probability, Bayes’ rule requires
that µ = 3
4+2p
.
2.1. Truth-leaning equilibrium. It is easy to verify that the game has a continuum of
perfect Bayesian equilibria, where p ≥ 1
4
, q = 0, and µ = 3
4+2p
≤ 2
3
. That is, the sender
with bad evidence discloses no evidence with at least probability 1
4
, and the receiver always
rejects the design.
However, there is no truth-leaning equilibrium. Given the receiver’s strategy, the sender
with bad evidence is indifferent between disclosing no evidence and disclosing truthfully
(since both actions yield payoff 0). Truth-leaning therefore requires the sender to disclose bad
evidence truthfully (i.e., p = 0), which is not satisfied by any perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
2.2. Purifiable equilibrium. Suppose that the receiver receives a payoff shock ζ for choos-
ing Approve, where ζ is normally distributed according to N (0, ε2) and is private information
of the receiver (hence the receiver’s type). That is, the receiver’s payoff from approving a
good design is 1+ζ , and that from approving a bad design is ζ−2. Hence, the receiver almost
always has a unique optimal action after seeing no evidence, which is Approve if µ > 2−ζ
3
(equivalently, ζ > 2−3µ) and Reject if µ < 2−ζ
3
(equivalently, ζ < 2−3µ). This implies that
the design is approved with probability Φ
(
3µ−2
ε
)
> 0 if the sender discloses no evidence in
any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the distubed game, where Φ is the cdf of standard nor-
mal distribution. Hence, the sender’s expected payoff from disclosing no evidence is strictly
higher than that from disclosing bad evidence truthfully, so the sender always discloses no
evidence.
To summarize, let q(ζ) be the probability that the type ζ receiver approves the design
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after observing no evidence. The disturbed game has a continuum of perfect Bayesian
equilibria, where p = 1, µ = 1
2
, and q(ζ) = 0 if ζ < 1
2
, q(ζ) ∈ [0, 1] if ζ = 1
2
, q(ζ) = 1 if
ζ > 1
2
. Since the sender strictly prefers disclosing no evidence, all perfect Bayesian equilibria
of any disturbed game are truth-leaning. Moreover, in all equilibria, the receiver chooses
Approve with probability Φ(− 1
2ε
) after observing no evidence. That is, the disturbed game
has a unique truth-leaning equilibrium outcome, where the sender discloses no evidence, and
after seeing no evidence, the receiver chooses Approve with probability Φ(− 1
2ε
) and believes
that the design is good with 1
2
probability.
As the disturbance diminishes (i.e., as ε ↓ 0), the unique equilibrium outcome of the
disturbed game converges to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the original evidence game,
where p = 1, q = 0, µ = 1
2
.
2.3. Weakly truth-leaning equilibrium. Let us consider the following perturbed game.
Let ε1 and ε2 be small positive reals that are common knowledge to the sender and the
receiver. The sender receives a reward ε1 if it discloses (bad evidence) truthfully, and the
sender must disclose truthfully with at least probability ε2.
If its posterior belief µ > 2
3
, then the receiver has a unique optimal action Approve after
observing no evidence. Then, for ε1 < 1, the sender strictly prefers disclosing no evidence,
so the Bayesian consistent belief is µ = 1
2
< 2
3
. If µ < 2
3
, the receiver’s unique optimal
action is Reject after observing no evidence. With the reward for truth-telling, the sender
strictly prefers disclosing truthfully, so the Bayesian consistent belief is µ = 3
4
> 2
3
. Hence,
the receiver’s posterior belief µ = 2
3
in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the perturbed
game. Indeed, for ε1 < 1 and ε2 ≤
3
4
, the perturbed game has a unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, where p = 1
4
, q = ε1, µ =
2
3
.
As ε1, ε2 ↓ 0, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the perturbed game converges to a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the original game, where p = 1
4
, q = 0, µ = 2
3
.
2.4. Discussions. Figure 1 summarizes the equilibria of the game. There is a continuum
of perfect Bayesian equilibria which differ only on the sender’s strategy. Among them,
the weakly truth-leaning equilibrium maximizes the probability that the sender discloses
truthfully. The purifiable equilibrium maximizes the receiver’s posterior belief on the good
design.
The fact that this simple game does not possess a truth-leaning equilibrium suggests that
truth-leaning equilibrium may not be a proper solution concept for finite evidence games.
A more fundamental problem of truth-leaning equilibrium is the discrepency between the
refinement and the intuition behind it. The requirement that the sender weakly prefers
disclosing truthfully seemingly arises from the sender having infinitesimal reward for truth-
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Figure 1: The probability that the sender discloses no evidence when having bad evidence
telling, but in the example, the weakly truth-leaning equilibrium constructed by adding an
infinitesimal reward for truth-telling is not the same as imposing truth-leaning refinement
on perfect Bayesian equilibria.6
Weakly truth-leaning equilibrium also has a few shortcomings. First, it may not be ro-
bust to incomplete receiver payoff information. In our example, the sender strictly prefers
disclosing no evidence once we introduce a small uncertainty to the receiver’s payoff. There-
fore, the weakly truth-leaning equilibrium where the sender having bad evidence discloses
no evidence with probability 1
4
is not robust to incomplete receiver payoff information. In
defense of weakly truth-leaning equilibrium, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in every per-
turbed game where the sender receives a small reward for truth-telling (viz., p = 1
4
, q = ε1,
µ = 2
3
) is robust to incomplete receiver payoff information in our example,7 but this is not a
generic result. In general, a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium may fail to be the limit point
of a sequence of equilibria of perturbed games that are robust to incomplete receiver payoff
information.
Second, different sequences of perturbations may select different weakly truth-leaning
equilibria, and not all sequences of perturbed games have a sequence of perfect Bayesian
equilibria that converges as the perturbation goes to zero.
Consider a slight variant to our example, where the sender’s bad evidence is either type
1 or type 2 (think about software failures and hardware failures). If the design is bad, the
6Recall that HKP shows the equivalence of truth-leaning equilibrium and weakly truth-leaning equilibrium
in evidence games where the recevier continuously chooses an action, and its payoff function is single-peaked
given any belief. In the current example, suppose that the receiver chooses an action a ∈ R, and the receiver’s
payoff is quadratic, i.e., −(a−x)2, where x is a random variable that equals 0 if the design is bad and 1 if the
design is good. The unique truth-leaning equilibrium is as follows. The sender always discloses no evidence,
the receiver’s belief and action are 12 after seeing no evidence and 0 after seeing bad evidence. This is also
the unique weakly truth-leaning equilibrium.
7To see this, consider a disturbed game where: (i) the sender receives ε1 if it discloses truthfully; (ii)
the sender must disclose truthfully with at least probability ε2; (iii) the receiver receives a payoff shock
ζ distributed according to N (0, ε2) for choosing Approve, which is its private information. For ε1 <
1
2 ,
ε2 <
3
4 , and ε <
3−4ε2
6−2ε2
· 1
−Φ−1(ε1)
, the disturbed game has a continuum of perfect Bayesian equilibria, where
p = 94+2εΦ−1(ε1) − 2, µ =
2+εΦ−1(ε1)
3 , q(ζ) = 0 if ζ < −εΦ
−1(ε1), q(ζ) ∈ [0, 1] if ζ = −εΦ−1(ε1), and q(ζ) = 1
if ζ > −εΦ−1(ε1). In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the design is approved with probability ε1 after the
receiver observes no evidence. As ε ↓ 0, this equilibrium outcome converges to p = 14 , q = ε1, µ =
2
3 .
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sender has type 1 bad evidence, type 2 bad evidence, and no evidence each with 1
3
probability;
if the design is good, the sender has no evidence. The sender with a certain type of bad
evidence can disclose truthfully or no evidence but cannot disclose the other type of bad
evidence. Let pi be the probability that the sender with type i bad evidence discloses no
evidence, q the probability that the receiver chooses Approve after seeing no evidence, and
µ the receiver’s belief that the design is good after seeing no evidence. The game has a
continuum of perfect Bayesian equilibria, where p1 + p2 ≥
1
2
, q = 0, and µ = 3
4+p1+p2
.
Now, let us consider the following perturbed game. Given small positive reals ε1, ε2 < 1
and ε1|1, ε2|2 ≤
1
2
, the sender receives a reward εi if it truthfully dicloses type i bad evidence,
and the sender with type i bad evidence must disclose truthfully with at least probability
εi|i. If εi < εj, the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium is pi =
1
2
, pj = 0, q = εi, µ =
2
3
. If
ε1 = ε2, there is a continuum of perfect Bayesian equilibria, where p1 + p2 =
1
2
, q = ε1 = ε2,
µ = 2
3
. Hence, as (ε1, ε1|1, ε2, ε2|2)→ 0, whether there exits a convergent sequence of perfect
Bayesian equilibria depends on the rates of convergence of ε1 and ε2. If ε1 = ε2 almost always,
then any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the unperturbed game such that p1 + p2 =
1
2
is the
limit point of a sequence of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the perturbed game. If εi ≤ εj
almost always, and εi < εj infinitely often, then the unique weakly truth-leaning equilibrium
is such that pi =
1
2
, pj = 0, q = 0, and µ =
2
3
. If neither case happens, there is no
convergent sequence of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the perturbed game. In conclusion, the
unperturbed game has a continuum of weakly truth-leaning equilibria, where p1 + p2 =
1
2
,
q = 0, µ = 2
3
, and different weakly truth-leaning equilibria may be selected by different sets
of infinitesimal perturbations.
Purifiable equilibrium is spared from similar problems. For “almost all” evidence games,
any purifiable equilibrium is infinitesimally close to a truth-leaning equilibrium of any in-
finitesimally perturbed game. That is, purifiability does not depend on the selection of
disturbances. The normality of the receiver’s payoff shock in our example is dispensable.
Moreover, the set of purifiable equilibria has a simple structure, and we give a characteriza-
tion of all purifiable equilibria in any evidence game.
3. The Evidence Game. There are two stages. Two players, a sender (she) and a
receiver (he), move sequentially. At the outset of the game, a state of the world ω ∈ {G,B}
is realized with probability pi0 ∈ (0, 1) on ω = G. Neither player observes the realized state
ω,8 and the prior pi0 is common knowledge. In the first stage, the sender observes a piece of
hard evidence e ∈ E and discloses m ∈ E to the receiver, where E is a finite set of evidence.
In the second stage, the receiver observes the disclosed evidence m and chooses an action
8Since the sender’s payoff is independent of the realized state, so it does not affect our analysis if the
realized state is known to the sender.
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a ∈ A, where A = {a1 < a2 < · · · < aK} is a finite subset of the real line.
3.1. Evidence and disclosure. Let FG and FB be two distributions over the set of evidence
E. The sender’s evidence e is a random draw from either FG or FB, depending on the realized
state. If ω = G, e is drawn from distribution FG; if ω = B, it is drawn from distribution FB.
Disclosure is verifiable. That is, the set of evidence that the sender can feasibly disclose
depends on the evidence she has (in contrast, in a signaling game, the sender, regardless of
her type, chooses from the same set of signals). Throughout the paper, We maintain the
following assumptions that are standard in the literature:
(Reflexivity) The sender can always truthfully diclose her evidence e;
(Transitivity) If the sender can disclose e′ when she has evidence e, and she can disclose
e′′ when she has evidence e′, then she can disclose e′′ if she has evidence e.
Under these assumptions, we can represent the “disclosure rule” as a preorder - on E.9
Disclosing m is feasible given evidence e if and only ifm - e, and the feasible set of disclosure
given a piece of evidence e is its lower contour set LC(e) = {m ∈ E : m - e}.
3.2. Payoffs. The receiver’s payoff uR(a, ω) depends on both his action and the realized
state of the world (but not the true evidence or the disclosed evidence), and the receiver
maximizes his expected payoff. We assume that the receiver’s payoff function satisfies the
following assumption:
(Increasing differences) uR(a,G)− uR(a, B) is strictly increasing in a.
Under this assumption, the receiver wants to match the sate of the world. That is, his optimal
action is weakly increasing in his posterior belief that the state is good. More precisely, given
µ ∈ [0, 1], the solution to the receiver’s maximization problem
φ(µ) = argmax
a∈A
µuR(a,G) + (1− µ)uR(a, B)
is upper hemicontinuous and weakly increasing in µ.10
The sender’s payoff equals the action of the receiver, i.e., uS(a, ω) = a. Given the
assumption on the receiver’s payoff, the sender has a weak incentive to persuade the receiver
that the state is good. Notice that the evidence e, the disclosed evidence m, and the realized
state ω are payoff irrelevant to the sender.
An evidence game is summarized by a tuple G = 〈pi0, (E,-), FG, FB, A, uR〉.
9A preorder - is a binary relation satisfying reflexivity (e - e for all e) and transitivity (e′′ - e′ - e ⇒
e′′ - e).
10Throughout the paper, we say a correspondence φ : [0, 1] ⇒ A is weakly increasing if ai ≤ aj for all
µi < µj , ai ∈ φ(µi), and aj ∈ φ(µj).
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3.3. Strategies and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. A (behavioral) strategy of the sender
is σ : E → ∆(E) such that supp(σ(·|e)) ⊂ LC(e), a (behavioral) strategy of the receiver is
ρ : E → ∆(A), and a system of beliefs of the receiver is µ : E → [0, 1], where µ(m) denotes
the receiver’s posterior belief that the state is good after observing m.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of G is a collection of the sender’s strategy, the receiver’s
strategy, and the receiver’s system of belief (σ, ρ, µ) such that:
(Sender optimaltiy) Given ρ,
supp(σ(·|e)) ⊂ argmax
m-e
∑
a∈A
a · ρ(a|m)
for all e ∈ E;
(Receiver optimality) Given µ,
supp(ρ(·|m)) ⊂ φ(µ(m))
for all m ∈ E;
(Bayesian consistency) For all on-path disclosure m ∈
⋃
e∈E supp(σ(·|e)),
µ(m) =
∑
e∈UC(m) σ(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈UC(m) σ(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)]
.
4. Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Sections 4.1 through 4.3 give
formal definitions to truth-leaning equilibrium, purifiable equilibrium, and weakly truth-
leaning equilibrium. Section 4.2 also characterizes purifiable equilibrium. Section 4.4 shows
the relationship between the three refinements.
4.1. Truth-leaning equilibrium. A truth-leaning equilibrium of G is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (σ, ρ, µ) such that:
(Truth-leaning) Given ρ,
e ∈ argmax
m-e
∑
a∈A
a · ρ(a|m)⇒ σ(e|e) = 1;
(Off-path beliefs) For all off-path disclosure m, µ(m) = ν(m), where
ν(m) =
FG(m)pi0
FG(m)pi0 + FB(m)(1− pi0)
.
As is shown in Section 2, a truth-leaning equilibrium of G may not exist.
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4.2. Disturbed games and purifiable equilibrium. A disturbed game is where the receiver
has a private payoff shock (i.e., type) ζ : A → R. The receiver has type dependent payoff
vR(a, ω|ζ) = uR(a, ω) + ζ(a). We identify the set of the receiver’s types with RK , where
K = |A| is the number of available receiver actions. Let η be a distribution over RK that
has full support and is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Denote
by GR(η) the disturbed game where the receiver’s type is distributed according to η.
In the disturbed game, a strategy of the sender is σ : E → ∆(E) such that supp(σ(·|e)) ⊂
LC(e), a strategy of the receiver in GR(η) is r : E × RK → ∆(A), and a system of beliefs
of the receiver is µ : E → [0, 1], where µ(m) is the receiver’s posterior belief that the state
is good after observing m.11 Given any strategy of the receiver r, let ρ : E → ∆(A) be the
induced distributions over the receiver’s actions. That is,
ρ(a|m) =
∫
r(a|m, ζ)η(dζ)
is the probability that the receiver takes action a after m is disclosed. We shall also use the
shorthand notation and write this as ρ = 〈r, η〉.
A truth-leaning equilibrium of GR(η) is a tuple (σ, r, µ) such that:
(Receiver optimality in disturbed games) Given µ,
supp(r(·|m, ζ)) ⊂ τ(µ(m), ζ)
for all m ∈ E and ζ ∈ RK , where τ(µ¯, ζ) ⊂ A is the solution to the type ζ receiver’s
problem given posterior belief µ¯ ∈ [0, 1] on the good state, i.e.,
τ(µ¯, ζ) = argmax
a∈A
µ¯uR(a,G) + (1− µ¯)uR(a, B) + ζ(a);
(Sender optimality), (Bayesian consistency), (Truth-leaning), and (Off-path be-
liefs), as are defined above for the original game G.
If (σ, r, µ) is a truth-leaning equilibrium, we say (σ, ρ, µ) is a truth-leaning equilibrium out-
come of GR(η).
In any disturbed game, the sender has a strict incentive to persuade the receiver–from the
sender’s perspective, the expected value of the receiver’s optimal action is strictly increasing
in his posterior belief. Therefore, a truth-leaning equilibrium exists in any disturbed game.
11The assumption that the receiver’s belief is independent of his type is without loss for finding truth-
leaning equilibrium, as on-path beliefs are determined by Bayes’ rule, and off-path beliefs are determined by
the refinement.
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Moreover, the truth-leaning equilibrium is essentially unique, and the receiver’s equilibrium
system of beliefs depends only on the eivndece structure, insteand of the player’s utility
functions. Hence, the receiver’s equilibrium system of beliefs is the same across all truth-
leaning equilibria of all disturbed games. In fact, the set of truth-leaning equilibria is the
same for all disturbed games.
Lemma 1. A truth-leaning equilibrium exists in all disturbed games. Moreover, there
exist a closed set Σ⋆ ⊂ ∆(E)E and a system of beliefs of the receiver µ⋆ such that for all
disturbed games GR(η), (σ, r, µ) is a truth-leaning equilibrium of GR(η) if and only if σ ∈ Σ⋆,
µ = µ⋆, and supp(r(·|m, ζ)) ⊂ τ(µ(m), ζ) for all m ∈ E and ζ ∈ RK.
A purifiable equilibrium is the limit point of a sequence of truth-leaning equilibria of
disturbed games as the payoff uncertainty goes to zero. Formally, a purifiable equilibrium
of G is a tuple (σ, ρ, µ) such that there exists a sequence of disturbances {ηn}∞n=1 and for
each ηn, a truth-leaning equilibrium outcome (σn, ρn, µn) of GR(ηn) such that ηn
w
−→ δ012 and
(σn, ρn, µn)→ (σ, ρ, µ).
By Lemma 1, it is easy to see that a purifiable equilibrium exists, and in any purifiable
equilibrium, σ ∈ Σ⋆ and µ = µ⋆. Since the receiver’s problem in any disturbed game depends
only on his type and his poterior belief, the receiver’s action after seeing a disclosed evidence
in any purifiable equilibrium should depend only on his posterior belief. That is, if two pieces
of evidence m and m′ are such that µ⋆(m) = µ⋆(m′), then ρ(·|m) = ρ(·|m′) in any purifiable
equilibrium.13 It turns out that conversely, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying these
conditions is a purifiable equilibrium.
Proposition 2. A purifiable equilibrium exists and is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Moreover, (σ, ρ, µ) is a purifiable equilibrium if and only if σ ∈ Σ⋆, µ = µ⋆, supp(ρ(·|m)) ⊂
φ(µ(m)) for all m ∈ E, and µ(m) = µ(m′)⇒ ρ(·|m) = ρ(m′, ·).
As is noted in Appendix A.1, the equilibrium system of beliefs µ⋆ and the set of the
sender’s equilibrium strategies Σ⋆ are determined by the evidence space (E,-) and the
distributions FG and FB. They are independent of the receiver’s payoff function uR.
It is also worth noting that, since the sender’s action (i.e., the disclosed evidence) is not
payoff relevant, evidence games are not generic in the sense of Harsanyi (1973).14 However,
all purifiable equilibria in “almost all” evidence games can be approached using an arbitrary
12That is, ηn converges weakly to the point mass at 0, i.e.,
∫
f dηn → f(0) for all bounded continuous
functions f : RK → R.
13By contrast, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium only requires that supp(ρ(·|m)) = supp(ρ(·|m′)).
14All Nash equilibria of an evidence game are irregular under the definition of van Damme (1996), since
given the receiver’s strategy, the sender is indifferent between all of her strategies.
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sequence of diminishing disturbances. By Proposition 2, if φ(µ⋆(m)) is a singleton for all
m ∈ E, then the receiver’s purifiable equilibrium strategy is unique and is a pure strategy
(viz. ρ(a|m) = 1a∈φ(µ⋆(m))). We show in Appendix A.2 that, in this case, any purifiable equi-
librium can be approached using arbitrary disturbances. That is, for all purifiable equilibria
(σ, ρ, µ) and all sequences of disturbances ηn
w
−→ δ0, there exists a sequence of truth-leaning
equilibrium outcomes of the disturbed games (σn, ρn, µn) that converges to (σ, ρ, µ). In Ap-
pendix A.5, we show that φ(µ⋆(m)) is a singleton for all m ∈ E in all but a measure zero
set of evidence games.
If φ(µ⋆(m)) is not a singleton for some m ∈ E, there exists a continuum of the receiver’s
purifiable equilibrium strategies. A given purifiable equilibrium may be the limit point of
truth-leaning equilibrium outcomes only for some sequences of disturbed games, and not
all sequences of disturbed games have a convergent sequence of truth-leaning equilibrium
outcomes. For example, consider a slight variant of the example in Section 2 where the
receiver’s payoff from approving a bad design is -1 (instead of -2). As a result, the receiver’s
belief threshold is 1
2
. There exists a continuum of purifiable equilibria, where p = 1, q ∈ [0, 1],
and µ = 1
2
. Specifically, there exists a purifiable equilibrium in which the receiver chooses
Approve and Reject with equal probability after seeing no evidence (i.e., q = 1
2
). But in order
to approach this equilibrium using truth-leaning equilibria of disturbed games, the sequence
of disturbances {ηn}∞n=1 must be such that η
n({ζ(Approve) > ζ(Reject)}) → 1
2
. That is,
along the sequence of disturbances, the probability that the receiver has a strict incentive
to choose Approve at belief 1
2
must converge to 1
2
, equating the probability that the receiver
chooses Approve in the intended purifiable equilibrium.
4.3. Perturbed games and weakly truth-leaning equilibrium. Let ε = {εe, εe|e}e∈E be a
collection of positive real numbers. The perturbed game GS(ε), as is defined in HKP, is
an evidence game where the sender who has evidence e receives an extra payoff εe if she
discloses truthfully, and she must disclose truthfully with at least probability εe|e. That is,
the sender’s payoff is vS(a, e,m) = a+ εe1e=m, and a strategy of the sender is σ : E → ∆(E)
such that supp(ρ(·|e)) ⊂ LC(e), and σ(e|e) ≥ εe|e for all e.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of GS(ε) is a collection of the sender’s strategy, the re-
ceiver’s strategy, and the receiver’s system of beliefs (σ, ρ, µ) such that:
(Sender optimality) Given ρ,
σ(m|e) > 0⇒ m ∈ argmax
m-e
∑
a∈A
vS(a, e,m) · ρ(a|m)
for all e and m 6= e;
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(Receiver optimality) and (Bayesian consistency), as are defined for G.
A weakly truth-leaning equilibrium of G is a tuple (σ, ρ, µ) such that there exists a sequence
of perturbations {εn}∞n=1 and for each ε
n, a PBE (σn, ρn, µn) of GS(εn) such that εn → 0, and
(σn, ρn, µn) → (σ, ρ, µ). A weakly truth-leaning equilibrium exists. As is shown in Section
2, diferent sequences of perturbations may select different weakly truth-leaning equilibria.
Proposition 3 (Proposition 1 in HKP). A weakly truth-leaning equilibrium exists and
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
4.4. Relationship between truth-leaning, weakly truth-leaning, and purifiable equilibrium.
The example in Section 2 indicates that purifiable equilibrium and weakly truth-leaning
equilibrium do not imply each other, and neither implies truth-leaning equilibrium.
In a slight variant of the example in Section 2, we shall see that an equilibrium that is
both truth-leaning and weakly truth-leaning can fail to be purifiable. Suppose that we alter
the distribution of the sender’s evidence when the design is good such that the sender has
bad evidence and no evidence with equal probability. The distribution when the design is
bad remains unchanged. The game has a unique truth-leaning equilibrium, where p = 0,
q = 0, µ = 3
5
.15 That is, the sender discloses truthfully, the receiver always rejects the design,
and the receiver’s belief on the good design is 3
5
after seeing no evidence. Notice that this is
also the unique weakly truth-leaning equilibrium of the game. However, it is not a purifiable
equilibrium. In the unique purifiable equilibrium of the game, the sender always discloses
no evidence, the receiver always rejects the project, and his belief on the good design is 1
2
after seeing no evidence (i.e., p = 1, q = 0, µ = 1
2
).
HKP shows that truth-leaning equilibrium and weakly truth-leaning equilibrium are
equivalent in a setting where the receiver continuously chooses an action on the real line.
This is not the case in finite evidence games. It turns out that purifiability is the missing
condition. On the one hand, if a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium is also purifiable, then
it is a truth-leaning equilibrium. On the other hand, for “almost all” evidence games, a
truth-leaning equilibrium that is also purifiable is a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium.
Proposition 4. If a truth-leaning equilibrium is purifiable, then it is also a weakly
truth-leaning equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Fix pi0, (E,-), FG, FB, and A. Let G be the set of all evidence games
15Although bad evidence is not fully revealing of the state, the receiver knows that the sender has bad
evidence after seeing bad evidence. Therefore, the receiver’s posterior belief on the good design is 37 , and the
receiver chooses Reject after seeing bad evidence in any equilibrium. Hence, we can describe an equilibrium
of the game using p, q, µ, as are defined in Section 2.
14
with prior pi0, evidence space (E,-), distributions of evidence FG and FB, and receiver action
space A. Identify G with a subset of R2K by the bijection
〈pi0, (E,-), FG, FB, A, uR〉 7→ {uR(a,G), uR(a, B)}a∈A.
Let N ⊂ G be the set of evidence games that have a purifiable truth-leaning equilibrium that
is not a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium. N has Lebesgue measure zero.
For nongeneric games, a purifiable truth-leaning equilibrium need not be weakly truth-
leaning. Cnosider again the example presented after Proposition 2 where the receiver’s belief
threshold is 1
2
. There exists a continuum of truth-leaning equilibria, where p = 1, q > 0, and
µ = 1
2
. As we have seen, all truth-leaning equilibria are purifiable in this game. However,
there is a unique weakly truth-leaning equilibrium in which p = 0, q = 0, and µ = 1
2
. All
other truth-leaning equilibria are not weakly truth-leaning. This example is not generic,
since the receiver is indifferent between Approve and Reject after seeing no evidence in
truth-leaning equilibria.
5. Conclusion. HKP propose truth-leaning equilibrium as a solution concept in ev-
idence games. The intuition is that the sender may find it slightly more advantageous to
disclose evidence truthfully when indifferent. This paper points out two problems of apply-
ing this solution concept to finite evidence games. First, it may fail to exist. Second, it may
not agree with the intuition that the sender receives an infinitesimal reward for truth-telling.
That is, truth-leaning equilibrium is not equivalent to weakly truth-leaning equilibrium in
finite evidence games.
We propose a simple solution to restore existence by adding a small payoff uncertainty to
the receiver. In the disturbed game, the sender is as if she faces a single receiver whom she has
strict incentive to persuade, and therefore, a truth-leaning equilibrium exists. A purifiable
equilibrium is the limit point of a sequence of truth-leaning equilibria of disturbed games.
That is, a purifiable equilibrium is a truth-leaning quilibrium in an infinitesimally disturbed
game. We show that a purifiable equilibrium always exists and has a simple characterization.
Purifiability also solves the second problem. If a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium is
also purifiable, then it is a truth-leaning equilibrium. Conversely, in almost all finite ev-
idence games, a truth-leaning equilibrium that is also purifiable is a weakly truth-leaning
equilibrium.
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1.
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Proof. Given any posterior belief µ ∈ [0, 1], two actions ai and aj are both optimal for
type ζ receiver only if ζ(aj)−ζ(ai) = µ[uR(ai, G)−uR(aj , G)]+(1−µ)[uR(ai, B)−uR(aj , B)].
By assumption, this is true only for an η-null set of ζ . Hence, τ(µ, ·) is η-a.e. a singleton
set. This allows us to define
ϕ(µ) =
∫
sup τ(µ, ζ)η(dζ) =
∫
inf τ(µ, ζ)η(dζ).
In any equilibrium (σ, r, µ) of the disturbed game, ϕ(µ(m)) is the sender’s expected payoff
if she discloses m.
Moreover, τ(·, ζ) is weakly increasing for all ζ ∈ RK . Let µi < µj, ai ∈ τ(µi, ζ), and
aj ∈ τ(µj , ζ). Then
µiuR(ai, G) + (1− µi)uR(ai, B) + ζ(ai) ≥ µiuR(aj, G) + (1− µi)uR(aj, B) + ζ(aj),
µjuR(aj , G) + (1− µj)uR(aj , B) + ζ(aj) ≥ µjuR(ai, G) + (1− µj)uR(ai, B) + ζ(ai).
Hence,
(A.1) (µj − µi)[uR(aj, G)− uR(aj , B)] ≥ (µj − µi)[uR(ai, G)− uR(ai, B)].
Since uR(a,G)− uR(a, B) is strictly increasing in a, (A.1) implies that aj ≥ ai.
Therefore, ϕ : [0, 1]→ R is strictly increasing. Suppose that, contrary to the claim, there
exist µi < µj such that ϕ(µi) = ϕ(µj). Then, for an η-a.e. set of ζ , τ(µi, ζ) = τ(µj , ζ).
This is true only if uR(a,G) − uR(a, B) is constant across all a ∈ A, which contradicts the
assumption of increasing differences.
Now consider an auxiliary evidence game G(ϕ) without receiver type, where the receiver
chooses an action in R, and given any posterior belief µ ∈ [0, 1], he has a unique optimal
action ϕ(µ). This is the standard setup in Jiang (2019). We are to establish a duality
between truth-leaning equilibria of GR(η) and truth-leaning equilibria of G(ϕ).
Let (σˆ, aˆ, µˆ) be a truth-leaning equilibrium of G(ϕ).16 Let r : E × RK → ∆(A) be such
that supp(r(·|m, ζ)) ⊂ τ(µˆ(m), ζ) for allm ∈ E and ζ ∈ RK . We are to show that (σˆ, r, µˆ) is a
truth-leaning equilibrium of GR(η). By construction, it satisfies receiver optimality, Bayesian
consistency, and the condition on off-path beliefs. We only need to verify sender optimality
and truth-leaning. Since τ(µˆ(m), ·) is η-a.e. a singleton for all m, r(a|m, ζ) = 1a∈τ(µˆ(m),ζ)
for all m, a, and almost all ζ . Hence, with slight abuse of notation,
∑
a∈A a · r(a|m, ζ) =
τ(µˆ(m), ζ) for all m and almost all ζ . Integrating over ζ on both sides,
∑
a∈A a · ρ(a|m) =
16
aˆ : E → R is a pure strategy of the receiver. Since given any posterior belief µ, the receiver has a unique
optimal action ϕ(µ). Thus, he uses a pure strategy such that aˆ = ϕ ◦ µˆ in any equilibrium of G(ϕ).
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ϕ(µˆ(m)) = aˆ(m). That is, the sender’s problem given aˆ in G(ϕ) is the same as the sender’s
problem given r in GR(η). Since (σˆ, ρˆ, µˆ) is sender optimal and truth-leaning, (σˆ, r, µˆ) is
therefore also sender optimal and truth-leaning.
Conversely, let (σˆ, rˆ, µˆ) be a truth-leaning equilibrium of GR(η), and define a = ϕ ◦ µˆ. It
is easy to see that (σˆ, a, µˆ) is a truth-leaning equilibrium of G(ϕ).
Jiang (2019) characterizes the truth-leaning equilibria of the auxiliary disclosure game.
Fixing a finite evidence space (E,-) and distributions FG and FB, a truth-leaning equilib-
rium exists in G(ϕ) for all strictly increasing ϕ : [0, 1]→ R. Moreover, there exists a system
of beliefs µ⋆ : E → [0, 1] such that for all strictly increasing ϕ, (σ, a, µ) is a truth-leaning
equilibrium of G(ϕ) if and only if µ = µ⋆, a = ϕ ◦ µ, σ(e|e) = 1µ(e)≤ν(e), and
(A.2) µ(m) = min
{
ν(m),
∑
e∈E σ(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈E σ(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)]
}
for all m ∈ E, where ν(·) = FG(·)π0
FG(·)π0+FB(·)(1−π0)
. Notice that the right hand side of (A.2) is
a continuous function of σ ∈ ∆(E)E . Therefore, there exists a closed subset Σ⋆ of ∆(E)E
such that (σ, a, µ) is a truth-leaning equilibrium of G(ϕ) if and only if σ ∈ Σ⋆, µ = µ⋆, and
a = ϕ◦µ. By the above duality, for all disturbances η, (σ, r, µ) is a truth-leaning equilibrium
of the disturbed game GR(η) if and only if σ ∈ Σ⋆, µ = µ⋆, and supp(r(·|m, ζ)) ⊂ τ(µ(m), ζ)
for all m ∈ E and ζ ∈ RK .
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. The first statement is implied by the second statement, since µ⋆ is Bayesian
consistent with any sender’s strategy σ ∈ Σ⋆ by Lemma 1, and φ is nonempty-valued.
For the “only if ” part of the second statement, let (σ, ρ, µ) be a purifiable equilibrium.
There exists a sequence of disturbances ηn
w
−→ δ0 and for each ηn, a truth-leaning equilibrium
(σn, rn, µn) of GR(η
n) such that (σn, ρn, µn) → (σ, ρ, µ), where ρn = 〈rn, ηn〉. By Lemma 1,
σn ∈ Σ⋆ for all n, and Σ⋆ is closed. Therefore, σ ∈ Σ⋆. Additionally, µn = µ⋆ for all n, so
µ = µ⋆. Fix any m ∈ E and a ∈ A such that a /∈ φ(µ(m)) = τ(µ(m), 0). Since τ is upper
hemicontinuous in ζ , there exists a neighborhood U of 0 in RK such that a /∈ τ(µ(m), ζ) for
all ζ ∈ U . By receiver optimality, rn(a|m, ζ) = 0 for all n and ζ ∈ U . Hence, as ηn
w
−→ δ0,
ρn(a|m) =
∫
rn(a|m, ζ)ηn(dζ)→ 0. That is, a /∈ supp(ρ(·|m)). Lastly, let m,m′ ∈ E be such
that µ(m) = µ(m′). Since τ(µ(m), ζ) = τ(µ(m′), ζ) for all ζ , rn(a|m, ζ) = rn(a|m′, ζ) for all
n, a, and almost all ζ . Therefore, ρn(·|m) = ρn(·|m′) for all n, so their limits also coincide,
i.e., ρ(·|m) = ρ(·|m′).
For the “if” part of the second statement, let (σ, ρ, µ) be such that σ ∈ Σ⋆, µ = µ⋆,
supp(ρ(·|m)) ⊂ φ(µ(m)) for all m ∈ E, and µ(m) = µ(m′) ⇒ ρ(·|m) = ρ(·|m′). We are
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to show that it is a purifiable equilibrium. Let µ1 < µ2 < · · · < µN be elements of µ(E),
i.e., all possible posterior beliefs of the receiver. Since τ is upper hemicontinuous in ζ , there
exists r > 0 such that τ(µi, ζ) ⊂ φ(µi) for all i and all ζ ∈ Br(0), where Br(0) denotes
the open ball of radius r around 0 in RK . For each α = (α1, α2, . . . , αN) ∈ ×Ni=1φ(µi), let
Vα be the set of ζ ∈ RK such that τ(µi, ζ) = {αi}. Notice that Vα are pairwise disjoint,⋃
α Vα = Br(0), and λζ ∈ Vα for all ζ ∈ Vα and λ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, each Vα has positive
Lebesgue measure.17 Let qn → ρ be a sequence such that supp(qn(·|m)) = φ(µ(m)) for all
m ∈ E, and µ(m) = µ(m′)⇒ qn(·|m) = qn(·|m′). By abuse of notation, we write qn(a|m) as
qn(a, µ(m)), and let xnα = Π
N
i=1q
n(αi, µi). x
n
α > 0 for all α and all n. Therefore, for each n, we
can define a distribution ηn over RK with full support and absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure such that ηn
(
1
n
Vα
)
= n−1
n
xnα for all α, where
1
n
Vα = {ζ : nζ ∈ Vα}
is a subset of Vα. By construction η
n w−→ δ0. Let r be any receiver strategy in the disturbed
games such that supp(r(·|m, ζ)) ⊂ τ(µ(m), ζ) for all m ∈ E and ζ ∈ RK . By Lemma 1,
(σ, r, µ) is a truth-leaning equilibrium of GR(ηn). Let (σ, ρn, µ) be the associated equilibrium
outcome. Notice that ρn(a|m) =
∫
r(a|m, ζ)ηn(dζ) is bounded from below by n−1
n
qn(a|m)
and from above by n−1
n
qn(a|m) + 1
n
, and recall that qn → ρ. Hence, ρn → ρ, and (σ, ρ, µ) is
a purifiable equilibrium.
Remarks. The above proof implies that, if φ(µ⋆(m)) is a singleton for all m ∈ E, there
exists a sequence of truth-leaning equilibrium outcomes of the disturbed games (σn, ρn, µn)
that converges to (σ, ρ, µ) for all purifiable equilibia (σ, ρ, µ) and all disturbances ηn
w
−→ δ0.
Let r be any receiver strategy in the disturbed games such that supp(r(·|m, ζ)) ⊂ τ(µ⋆(m), ζ)
for all m ∈ E and ζ ∈ RK . By Lemma 1, (σ, r, µ) is a truth-leaning equilibrium of all
disturbed games GR(ηn). Since τ is upper hemicontinuous in ζ , and φ(µ⋆(m)) is a singleton
for all m ∈ E, r(a|m, ·) is constant on a small neighborhood of 0 in RK for all a ∈ A and
m ∈ E. Hence, ρn(a|m)→ r(a|m, 0) = ρ(a|m) for all a ∈ A and m ∈ E.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. The proof works similarly as in HKP despite different settings. First, observe
that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in every perturbed game GS(ε). The set of sender
strategies in the perturbed game Σ ⊂ ∆(E)E and the set of receiver strategies ∆(A)E are
convex and compact. Given a strategy of the receiver, the set of sender strategies that are
sender optimal is closed and nonempty. This yields an upper hemicontinuous best response
correspondence of the sender ΓS : ∆(A)
E ⇒ Σ. Given a sender strategy σ, since all evidence
17Since τ is upper hemicontinuous in ζ, we only need to show that Vα is nonempty for all α. Notice
that τ(µi, ζ) = {αi} if and only if ζ(αi) > ζ(a′) for all a′ ∈ φ(µi), a′ 6= αi. The assumption of increasing
differences guarantees that all inequalities can be simultaneously satisfied for all i. Hence, Vα is nonempty.
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is disclosed with positive probability, there is a unique Bayesian consistent system of beliefs
µσ, and the mapping σ 7→ µσ is continuous. Since the solution to the receiver’s optimality
problem φ is upper hemicontinuous, we have an upper hemicontinuous best response corre-
spondence of the receiver ΓR : Σ ⇒ ∆(A)
E such that ΓR(σ) = ×m∈E∆(φ(ρσ(m))). Then
by the Kakutani fixed point-theorem, there exists σ, ρ such that σ ∈ ΓS(ρ) and ρ ∈ ΓR(σ).
That is, the perturbed game has a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium paired with the
system of beliefs µσ consists of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the perturbed game.
Since the set of sender’ strategies {σ : supp(σ(·|e) ⊂ LC(e)} ⊂ ∆(E)E , ∆(A)E , and [0, 1]E
are compact, any sequence of perfect Bayesian equilibria of perturbed games {(σn, ρn, µn)}∞n=1
has a convergent subsequence. Hence, a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium exists. It is easy
to verify that any weakly truth-leaning equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. Let (σ, ρ, µ) be a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium that is also purifiable. We
show that (1) if σ(e|e) > 0, then σ(e|e) = 1, and (2) if σ(e|e) = 0, then e /∈ argmaxm-e
∑
a∈A a·
ρ(a|m), and µ(e) = ν(e).
The first claim is due to purifiability. Let ηn
w
−→ δ0, and (σn, ρn, µn) → (σ, ρ, µ) be such
that (σn, ρn, µn) is a truth-leaning outcome of GR(ηn) for all n. If σ(e|e) > 0, then there
exists N such that σn(e|e) > 0 for all n ≥ N . However, (σn, ρn, µn) is truth-leaning, so
σn(e|e) = 1 for all n ≥ N . Therefore, σ(e|e) = 1.
The second claim is due to weakly truth-leaning. Let εn → 0, and (σn, ρn, µn)→ (σ, ρ, µ)
be such that (σn, ρn, µn) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of GS(εn) for all n. If σ(e|e) = 0,
e /∈ argmaxm-e
∑
a∈A a · ρ(a|m). Otherwise, for all n, e is the unique maximizer to the
sender’s problem in GS(ε
n), so σn(e|e) = 1, and σn 6→ σ. Hence, for all e′ ≻ e and all n,
σn(e|e′) = 0. By Bayes’ rule, µn(e) = ν(e) for all n. Therefore, µ(e) = ν(e).
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. Notice that the receiver’s system of beliefs µ⋆ is the same across all puri-
fiable equilibria of all games in G . Moreover, given any two actions ai, aj and a be-
lief µ, the receiver is indifferent between actions ai and aj at µ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if
u(ai, G), u(ai, B), u(aj, G), u(aj, B) are on a hyperplane in R
4. Therefore, the receiver is
indifferent at some belief µ⋆(m) only on a Lebesgue null set of G. We are to show that, if
φ(µ⋆(m)) is a singleton for all m ∈ E, then a truth-leaning equilibria that is also purifiable
is weakly truth-leaning. This concludes that N has Lebesgue measure zero.
Let G ∈ G be such that φ(µ⋆(m)) is a singleton for all m, and (σ, ρ, µ⋆) a truth-leaning
equilibrium of G that is also purifiable. Given any perturbtion ε = {εe, εe|e}e∈E , we define
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(σε, ρε, µε) as follows:
(1) σε(e|e) = 1 if σ(e|e) = 1;
(2) σε(e|e) = εe|e, and σε(m|e) = (1− εe|e)σ(m|e) for all m 6= e if σ(e|e) = 0;
(3) ρε = ρ;
(4) µε is by Bayes’ rule, i.e.,
µ(m) =
∑
e∈UC(m) σε(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈UC(m) σε(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)]
.
For sufficiently small ε, (σε, ρε, µε) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of G(ε). Sender
optimality is satisfied if
εe < max
m
∑
a∈A
a[ρ(a|m)− ρ(a|e)]
for all e ∈ E such that σ(e|e) = 0. For all m ∈ E, since φ is upper hemicontinuous and
µ⋆(m) is a singleton for all m, there exists δ > 0 such that φ(µ) = φ(µ⋆(m)) for all m
and all µ ∈ [0, 1] such that |µ − µ⋆(m)| < δ. Since µε → µ⋆, when ε is sufficiently small,
ρε(a|m) = ρ(a|m) = 1a=φ(µε(m)) = 1a=φ(µ⋆(m)) for all m ∈ E. That is, receiver optimality is
satisfied. By construction, it is also Bayesian consistent, and (σε, ρε, µε) → (σ, ρ, µ) for any
sequence ε→ 0. Therefore, (σ, ρ, µ) is a weakly truth-leaning equilibrium.
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